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Vulnerability of passwords consisting of Numerical
Repetitive Sequences in the WPA2 protocol
Genc Gregor Kelmendi, Edmond Hajrizi
UBT – Higher Education Institution, Lagjja Kalabria, 10000 p.n., Prishtine,
Kosovo

Abstract. Protocols that govern wireless security WPA2/WPA have been proven much more
secure in comparison to their predecessor WEP. However, the human factor jeopardizes the
solidity of cryptography by implementing passwords consisting of programmatically
predictable numerical structures such as
1234512345, 11114444, 999888777 and so on. The methods presented in this paper are
effective in decrypting such passwords within seconds using ordinary
processor power. The prevalence of this vulnerable practice in the Prishtina (Kosovo) region is
estimated to be 15.7% in 89 tested wireless routers. Under this study such types of passwords
are termed and referred to as Numerical Repetitive Sequences or NRS. The paper defines NRS
mathematically, identifies
NRS types, composes formulas for calculating variations, presents algorithms to generate NRS,
and proposes tools to implement attacks. The methods documented in this study should only be
used for educational purposes.
Keywords: wireless password, network security, mathematical sequences, arithmetic
progression, handshake attack

Introduction
Among the additional security that WPA/WPA2 protocols provided compared to the WEP
predecessor, was the minimum password length requirement of 8 characters. This was intended
to condition users to implement passwords more resistant to brute-force attacks. But by not
validating the type of inserted characters, a security hole is left where the password can consist
of repeatable characters and sequences, and therefore rendering them predictable. The length
criterion alone cannot effectively avoid unsafe practices. A password consisting of 8 characters
of the digit 51 is as unsafe as a password consisting of only one character of number 5.
Similarly, a password of type "11223344" is as unsafe as a 4 character password of "1234 ".
Character replication or repetition can be easily simulated programmatically, and therefore does
not increase the entropy and strength of the password.
Passwords consisting of numbers only are particularly vulnerable to brute-force attacks. This is
because the decimal base of numbers consist of only 10 elements (0-9), and the variations are
significantly smaller when compared to alphabets which have a richer amount of elements.
When these numeric passwords are also limited to certain templates, they even further endanger
the security of the system. For example, passwords 1234512345, 11114444, or 999888777 are
not only numerical by nature, but also suffer from replications and fixed progressions
(incremental or decremental). Unfortunately, such passwords are often applied in the wireless
domain. After taking a closer look, we realize that these types of passwords are essentially
arithmetic sequences that are replicated for a given number of times, therefore for an easier
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reference they will be referred to as Numerical Repetitive Sequences (NRS). In this paper NRSs
will be mathematically defined, algorithmically generated, and implemented as a dictionary
attack against the captured WPA handshake.

NRS Definition
Numerical Repetitive Sequences (NRS) is the numerical string of the length l that replicates the
finite arithmetic sequence of the form:
Where the first term 1 and the upper limit l meet the conditions

While distance
Such as

is defined as

= 0 if and only if n = 1, generating constant arithmetic sequence

If n < l arithmetic sequence or each term is replicated l/n times successively, thus producing the
numerical repetitive sequence with length l.

Types of NRS
Definition 1. If each term is replicated separately l/n times, the sequence is labeled as internal
sequence, and symbolically is denoted as .
Definition 2. If entire sequence is replicated l/n , the sequence is labeled as external sequence,
and symbolically is denoted as .
Definition 3. The S sequence is a singular sequence if n = l and is symbolically denoted as .
The singular sequence is neither internal nor external. Since the upper bound is equal to the
length of the sequence n = l, neither sequence nor terms can be replicated.
Definition 4. The S sequence is a constant sequence if = 0 and is symbolically denoted as 0.
The constant sequence is both an internal and an external sequence at the same time. Since d is
0, it follows from equation (5) that the string has only one term. Thus since { } = 1 the whole
sequence and the corresponding terms are repeated l times, satisfying the definitions 1 and 2.
Primes greater than 10 have only constant sequences.
Definition 5. The S sequence is an incremental sequence if > 0 is symbolically denoted as
+.
Definition 6. The S sequence is a decremental sequence if < 0 is symbolically denoted as −.

Examples
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Analysis and Variations Formulas for NRS
Various lengths of sequences determine different values of variables n, and 1 thus producing
different variations for every length and consequently disables the application of classic
formulas for calculating variations. In this analysis we will compile formulas that calculate
separately the variations of constant, singular, and internal/external sequences, and summing
the total sum at the end.

Formulas for calculating variations of constant sequences
Each length l has 10 constant sequences because each number is integer with 1. It follows that
for each length there are 10 constant variations, a variation for each value 0-9 replicated as long
as the sequence is long, and this can be marked as:
| | = 10 (9)
Length consisting of prime numbers greater than 10 only have constant sequences,
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which means their variation is always 10, as demonstrated by Example 5 and the following
proof.
Proof. By definition prime numbers have no other factors except 1 and themselves. According
to equation (2) in Chapter 2, the NRS definition limits the upper limit not greater than or equal
to 10, consequently the only allowed upper limit for prime numbers remains to be number 1.
When the upper limit is 1, the distance is 0 and it follows that the sequence is always constant
with an amount of 10 variations.

Formulas for calculating variations of singular sequences
Given the equation (2) n cannot be greater than 10 and also the sequence is singular only if l is
equal to n, then it logically follows that lengths greater than 10 have no singular sequences.
Following formula calculates variations of singular sequences:

From this formula we note that if l is greater than 10 the result will be negative (or zero), and
the function denoted by the symbol + gets only the positive part2, as it is also illustrated in the
equation (16), where it follows that the set of singular sequences for the respective length is an
empty set.
| | = ∅ ⇔ l > 10

(11)

Formulas for calculating variations of internal and external sequences
Values of n produce fixed variations regardless of the length of the sequence, the length simply
determines how many times those variations need to be replicated. Thus, e.g. the upper limit n
= 4 produces 48 internal and external sequences, even when the length l is 8 or 12 or any other
length that is divisible to the limit n = 4. This demonstrates that NRS passwords are unsafe
regardless of their length, and increasing the length does not effectively enrich the variation
pool. Table 1 illustrates the variations given for each value of variables n with the potential to
produce internal or external sequences.
Table 1. Variations of

, for a given .

The formula that calculates the internal and external variations for a given n is

Where k is the maximum distance supported by the given n, as defined by equation (4).
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Total variations of NRS for a given length
The formula that calculates the total variations for a given length is:

Example 4. Calculate the total variations for length 9.

Explanation 1. The formula conditions the upper limit to be divisive with . Thus, the factors of
9 are {1,3,9}. The first sigma starts from number 2 to − 1 which is 8. From 2 to 8 is only one
number that is proportional to 9, and it is 3. For upper limit 3 the second sigma is applied
starting at distance 1 and is increased up to 4. Any increment greater than 4 it returns an empty
set. For example, if is 5 then 10 − 5(3 − 1) = 0. In this manner = 4. After calculating the
Sigma’s, the singular variations 4 and the constant variations 10 are added.
Example 5. Calculate the total variations for length 29.

Explanation 2. The formula conditions the upper limit to be a factor of . But, number 29 being
a prim number does not have any factor within the definition of sigma (withing the range ≥ 2
and − 1). As such first sigma does not apply, and consequently neither the second. The last
part of the formula is replaced with actual values and is calculated. Since the result is negative
−18, only the positive part is obtained which is 0 by using the following function from the
reference [8]:

Algorithm for the Generation of NRS List
The following is a function of the C# language that returns the entire NRS list for a given
length:
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Methodology of Attack
The methodology for decrypting NRS passwords of WPA and WPA2 wireless router consists
of the following steps:
a) Generate the list of NRSs for lengths of 8 to 20 and is stored in a text file.
b) The victim wireless handshake is captured using the wifite tool.
c) The handshake is attacked by importing the text file in the pyrit
d) If the handshake is decrypted using one of the passwords generated as NRS, the
attack will be considered successful.
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Fig. 1. Example of successful decryption.
The SPN password in Figure 1 successfully broken is 123123123. This is a password of length
9, with distance 1, external replication of value 3, initial term 1 and upper limit 3.
We also note that 887 passwords were tried per second. The pyrit tool has completed the entire
NRS list with 2090 combinations in 2.4 seconds. The CPU processor used for these attacks is
the Core2 Duo P8600 @ 2.4 Ghz. Although it is a relatively old
2009 processor with a sub-average processor power it has managed to try NRS
passwords up to 20 characters within 2-3 seconds.

The Prevalence of the Vulnerability
Statistics in the following table 2 are based on 89 handshakes captured in 5 different locations.
Handshakes are tried to be decrypted with NRS list of the length from 8 to
20 with a total variation pool of 2090 passwords. Out of the 89 tested wirelesses, 14
NRS passwords were successfully extracted, accounting for approximately 16% of all wireless
tested
The frequency of successfully decrypted NRS passwords is as follows: 12345678 (6 times);
123456789 (2 times); 0000011111 (1 time); 22223333 (1 time); 77778888 (1 time); 1231231
23 (1 time); 12341234 (1 time) and 777888999 (1 time).
Table 2. Statistics on the success of WPA handshake decryption grouped by location, and the
respective total score.

Amount of handshakes
Decrypted

Loc. 1
25
3

Loc. 2
9
0

Loc. 3
14
2

Loc. 4
6
3

Loc. 5
35
6

Total
89
14

Failed

22

9

12

3

29

Success rate

12%

0%

14.3%

50%

17.1%

75
15.73
%

Conclusion
The efficiency of NRS list is very high in the wireless domain. With a variation of only 2090
passwords it managed to decrypt the WPA / WPA2 handshake successfully in 15.7% of the
cases. Additional studies and statistics are needed to verify this success rate in other
international regions.
Acknowledgment. Acknowledgments to Prof. Dr. Edmond Hajrizi, Msc. Naim Preniqi and
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